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Abstract: 
The collapse of Overend Gurney and the ensuing crisis of 1866 was a turning point in British financial 
history: this was the last time a serious disruption took place in the London money market until 2007-
8. The achievement of relative stability was due to the Bank’s willingness to offer generous assistance 
to the market in a crisis, combined with an elaborate system for discouraging moral hazard. The 
Bank’s assistance was not anonymous because it monitored the names on its discounted bills. When 
Overend Gurney sought extraordinary assistance from the Bank, their request was refused on the 
grounds that the bills offered did not comply with standard eligibility rules. The Bank’s refusal forced 
Overend to suspend payments and there was a general panic in the market. The Bank responded by 
lending freely and raising Bank rate to very high levels. The new policy was crucial in allowing for the 
establishment of sterling as an international currency. When in 1890 Baring Bros got into trouble, 
however, the Bank reacted differently and set up a bailout of the failing institution. Such such a 
contrasting attitude was dictated by the dissimilar position occupied by Overends (a bill broker) and 
Barings (an accepting house) within the London money market. 
 
JEL: E42, E58, F33, N13. 
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The so-called Overend-Gurney crisis of 1866 was a major turning point in British 
monetary and financial history. Following the emergence of a modern financial system in the 
18th century, the country had been plagued by recurrent panics. In every decade of the 19th 
century until the crisis of 1866, there had been a point when, following a phase of credit 
expansion and “speculation”, market conditions had deteriorated, and the money market 
seized. 1866 was just one more run in a series that included, among the most infamous, 1825, 
1837-39, 1847, 1857. Yet the run that began in May 1866, was to be the last of that variety to 
occur in the United Kingdom until the outbreak of WWI. The only two relevant episodes of 
financial stress that occurred between 1866 and 1914 (1878 and the “Baring crisis” of 1890) 
did not have much in common with previous financial shocks neither in virulence nor in 
nature, since – unlike the previous crises – they were not accompanied by dislocations of the 
money market. 
This surprising feat has fascinated economists and historians alike, and they have sought 
to understand its reasons. All eyes have been rightly turned towards the Bank of England, but 
what exactly were the actions that planted the seeds of financial stability remains disputed. 
Fetter (1965) characterized the 1870s as the era that saw the “victory of the Bagehot 
principle” during the 1870s (Fetter 1965). According to Giannini (1999) the newly acquired 
stability of the British financial system owes to the Bank of England’s new willingness to 
undertake lifeboat operations (also see Mahate 1994). According to others, Britain’s new 
financial resilience owed to consolidations in the Bank’s macro-policy including its adherence 
to the Gold Standard (Schwartz 1987, 1995): Restrictions on the Bank’s discretionary power 
over the issue of high-powered money (the Gold Standard’s “rule”) would have stabilized the 
system by improving agents’ ability to make forecasts. Still others emphasize micro-
prudential aspects of crisis management, such as the emergence of automatic, anonymous 
lending on recognizably good collateral. For instance, according to Capie’s frosted glass 
discount window metaphor (Capie 2002, pp. 310-1), the Bank’s discount window was raised 
high enough to examine the quality of the collateral, without revealing the identity of the 
discounter: The central banker “does not know, nor does he care, who is on the other side of 
the window. He simply discounts good quality paper or lends on the basis of good collateral”. 
Other arguments emphasizing micro-prudential features include Calomiris (2011), who argues 
that the Overend-Gurney crisis served to establish the Bank of England’s credibility and 
ability to act in a fully discretional way. The episode rebutted the principle of “too-big-to-fail” 
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and signalled the Bank’s decision to terminate “the put option inherent in the Bank’s 
willingness to accommodate demand”.1 
This chapter discusses what really happened in 1866. For one thing, Bagehot (1873) never 
advised central bankers to engage into “lifeboat operations”. He advised them to provide 
generous lending – essentially, to do away with credit rationing which had prevailed in 
previous crises. As recent research has shown, 1866 was indeed a watershed (something 
Bagehot himself had recognized). In 1866, the Bank had in practice – if not officially – acted 
as a lender of last resort, abstaining from credit rationing and as a result effectively becoming 
the place where the crisis was resolved (Bignon, Flandreau, and Ugolini 2012). Using new 
statistical evidence from previous joint research (Flandreau and Ugolini, 2013) this chapter 
goes one stage further and provides a fuller characterization of the events in 1866 and of the 
revolution that occurred then: In contrast with Capie, we argue that Britain’s actual recipe for 
financial stability was the Bank of England’s adoption of a principle of generous provision of 
non-anonymous lending. In other words, the Bank’s window was fully raised so that the Bank 
could see the face of the discounter. The Bank was prepared to provide credit only to the 
extent that it liked what it saw. This meant that the counterparty had to abide by a number of 
behavioural norms: At the same time the Bank lent generously, it also performed strict 
monitoring over the banking system and thus protected itself against moral hazard. Tightened 
supervision and generous lending were the two sides of the new currency. 
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 1 reviews the structure of the 
English financial system on the eve of the Overend-Gurney Panic. Section 2 analyses in detail 
the Bank of England’s actions during the crisis. In the light of this evidence, section 3 
provides a characterization of Britain’s newly formed approach to financial stability. Section 
4 emphasizes the international aspects of the new policy adopted in 1866: We argue that the 
new policy helped entrench sterling as an unrivalled international currency. The conclusion 
sums up the findings and provides a comparison between the events in 1866 and the Baring 
Crisis of 1890. 
 
 
 
                                                          
1
 Rejection of the too-big-to-fail principle is also a central theme of Capie (2002). One paper skeptical about the 
Bank of England’s role in fostering financial stability is Batchelor (1986). He argues that after 1866 there was an 
increase in the amount of information available to the public concerning the quality of collateral held by the 
banking system. 
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1. The Structure of the English Financial System on the Eve of 1866 
 
Since the early modern era, European financial systems had been developing around a 
particular form of money market instruments: bills of exchange. Bills were negotiable 
promissory notes bearing multiple guarantees: bound to be paid at maturity by one person (the 
“acceptor” or insurer) who had agreed to certify the quality of the original debtor (the 
drawer), they were also secured by the signatures of all the people who had previously held 
and resold them (the endorsers). The bill market flourished in England during the Industrial 
Revolution, and specialized intermediaries (the bill brokers) started to emerge at the 
beginning of the 19th century. 
According to King (1936), the centrality of bill brokers within the system was established 
following the crisis of 1825 (initially known as “The Panic”). During this crisis, rampant 
credit rationing by the Bank of England made major London banks – which were heavily 
invested in bills – experience a serious maturity mismatch, which forced them to suspend 
payments. Scared by this episode, commercial banks vowed never to find themselves in the 
same situation again: Instead of keeping all of their assets in bills, the banks started to deposit 
large amounts of money “on call” with bill brokers, to whom the liquidity risk was shifted. 
This very episode transformed the English financial system into one which was unlike any 
other. Bill brokers (or “discount houses”, as they came to be known later on) evolved from 
being brokers to being money market funds, taking deposits from banks and investing them 
directly (on their own account) in the bill market. In normal times risks were limited, and so 
were margins, encouraging substantial leverage: According to King (1935), the ratio of total 
assets to capital hovered around 10 in the mid-19th century, and this was typically larger than 
what a “typical” bank would do. 
This is how Britain’s variant of the modern “shadow banking system” was born. Initially, 
the Bank of England saw favourably an evolution, which was supposed to help it manage the 
money market at arm’s length through the rediscounting system. However, relations gradually 
deteriorated. According to Wood (1939) this was caused by the Act of 1844, which 
sanctioned the private company character of the Bank. Encouraged to compete directly on the 
discount market, the Bank started to see bill brokers as challengers and its own rediscount 
facilities as a free lunch provided to these challengers. 
Figure 1 summarizes the basic features of the English financial system as it had been 
evolving after the turning points of 1825 and 1844. In this system, credit seekers obtained 
funding by drawing bills which, once accepted by specialized merchant banks (or “acceptance 
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houses”, as they came to be known later on), were sold (or “discounted”) on the money 
market. This was the hunting ground for bill brokers, who sought a profitable re-employment 
of the funds deposited with them by commercial banks – which, in turn, collected deposits 
from the general public. As Figure 1 shows, the Bank and the bill brokers competed against 
one another and it is plausible that this competition was one aspect of the tensions that grew 
steadily between the Old Lady of Threadneedle Street and the bill brokers – in particular the 
biggest and most “prestigious” of them all, Overend, Gurney & Co. – setting the stage for the 
final denouement of May 1866 when the Bank refused to bail out “Overends”. 
The deteriorating relation between the Bank and the bill brokers (and principally Overends) 
cannot be solely explained in term of commercial rivalry. Because bill brokers were money 
market specialists, the Bank of England could, to some extent at least, “outsource” to them the 
screening of bills and just rely on the guarantee provided by them. Moreover, the generosity 
of bill brokers set the conditions of the money market: Attempts by the Bank of England to, 
say, tighten money market conditions could be frustrated by bill brokers’ expansionary 
policies. In other words, the bill brokers had both a prudential role and a monetary policy role. 
The Bank of England’s need to make its rate “effective” in order to protect the gold reserve (a 
big theme of the 1850s) ran against this circumstance, and contained seeds of discord. 
The conflict between the Bank of England and Overend, Gurney & Co. became overt in the 
aftermath of the crisis of 1857. During this panic, bill brokers resorted extensively to the 
Bank’s rediscounting facilities, and Bank’s directors started to think that the inherent 
inconsistency of the system had reached breaking point. By the end of November 1857, the 
Bank held £1.2m in bills rediscounted to Overends, which amounted to 3.37% of its total 
portfolio of commercial securities2. This number might look unimpressive, but it reflected a 
broader patterns among all bill brokers, and this is what was perceived as unbearable. The 
argument was that, had the bill brokers refrained earlier from reckless lending, the crisis 
would have been avoided. Bill brokers should have reduced leverage by keeping higher cash 
reserves and it was their automatic access to the Bank’s discount window that created moral 
hazard. To provide incentives in this direction, in March 1858 it issued a public statement 
which announced its willingness to shut down rediscounting facilities to bill brokers, except 
in exceptional circumstances. The press personalized the move as directed against Overend, 
Gurney & Co., and commented unfavourably (King 1936, pp. 202-3). Overends felt strong 
enough to indulge into retaliatory action: in April 1860, they orchestrated a mini-run on the 
                                                          
2
 Authors’ computations on Bank of England Archive C25/3 and The Economist (21st November 1857). 
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Bank of England by building a position there and suddenly withdrawing £3m banknotes, thus 
creating disturbances in the money market. However, according to Bagehot (1873, p. 299) the 
attempt failed to achieve its probable objective of strengthening the bill brokers’ case by 
exposing the vulnerability of the Bank of England: Instead, he says, the attack on the Bank’s 
reserve made Overends unpopular with the City. 
 
Figure 1 about here 
 
 
2. Bank of England Lending during the Overend-Gurney Crisis 
 
The aftermath of the crisis of 1857 saw a considerable expansion of discount houses and 
joint-stock banks, which King (1936, p. 217) associates with the Companies Act. Another 
relevant aspect of the boom was the internationalization of the bill market (Hughes 1960). 
The massive expansion in international trade during the 1850s conspired London’s 
comparative advantage in trade finance to encourage the multiplication of originators 
(merchant or joint stock banks) and money market funds (bill brokers). Those with foreign 
connections and a London base could make large profits because they could take advantage of 
local information and London facilities. Figures provided by Roberts (1992) for Schroders, a 
merchant bank with contacts with the Continent and the US, suggest that in the early 1860s 
the profitability of acceptances was enormous – between 4 and 6% of the amounts accepted. 
Figures quickly declined afterwards, possibly reflecting the effects of competition.3 The result 
was internationalization of the London money market – sterling acceptances becoming a 
funding and investing vehicle of choice. 
As was bound to be the case, not all those joining the craze were prudent: Many sought to 
enhance returns by investing short-term resources in long term or illiquid resources. Overends 
bucked the trend, and in the early 1860s they got increasingly invested in speculative-grade 
bills: as one investment after the other failed, they ended up with non-performing assets and 
                                                          
3
 Figure computed using data provided by Roberts (1992,p p. 527 and 532). Acceptances were for a few months 
(typically 90 days), so that to compute the annual rate of return, one must compare annual revenues from 
acceptances and acceptances outstanding on the balance sheet at the end of the year (assuming they were 
essentially rolled over). Data for the early 1860s also include consignments made by Schroders: Controlling for 
these on the basis of later proportions gives the lower bound reported. Note that technically, acceptances 
appeared for the same amount on the asset and liabilities side of the balance sheet, and it was understood that 
some capital had to be set aside to meet contingencies. 
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their liquidity declined.4 In an attempt to attract fresh capital, the partnership was transformed 
into a limited liability company and floated on the stock exchange in 1865. Bagehot (1873, 
pp. 274-5) saw this move as the real cause of the firm’s eventual fall, because henceforth 
losses became of public knowledge and its reputation got irremediably tarnished. Further 
shocks included a long period of high interest rates in London, which exacerbated the 
company’s refinancing difficulties (figure 2), the stock market collapse of late 1865 and early 
1866, and the failure of a number of customers. Calls to other bankers were unsuccessful and, 
in a last ditch effort, the Bank of England was approached in early May, but the “Governor 
took the view that the Bank could not assist one concern unless it was prepared to also assist 
the many others which were known to be in similar plight.”5 This was decided after a 
confidential report was commissioned to investigate whether assistance by the Bank or a 
consortium of London commercial banks was an option. At 3:30 p.m., May 10, 1866, 
Overend Gurney & Co. suspended payments. The immediate reaction was described as the 
“wildest panic”. Contemporaries compared the event to an “earthquake”. From King (1936, p. 
243): It is “impossible to describe the terror and anxiety which took possession of men’s 
minds for the remainder of that and the whole of the succeeding day.” 
 
Figure 2 about here 
 
How did the Bank react to the panic? In the months preceding the crisis, market interest 
rates had almost constantly coincided with the Bank’s discount rate. This was evidence of 
money market tension, which the Bank was nonetheless accommodating (Bignon, Flandreau, 
and Ugolini 2012). After the announcement of Overend’s suspension, the official discount 
rate was raised from 7% to 9% and then 10%, but again, the market rate never exceeded this 
threshold (figure 2). In other words, the Bank continued to meet the considerably increased 
demand for cash. Both channels through which the Bank provided liquidity to the banking 
system – discounts of bills and advances on securities (including “parcels”, i.e. bundles, of 
bills) – were heavily resorted to, and very few demands for cash were rejected (figure 3). In 
other words, the Bank was not losing its cool and continued to inject liquidity in the system. 
Who was coming to the Bank’s standing facilities? There comes an interesting finding: In 
spite of the official ban of March 1858, bill brokers dominated the stage. They were, by far, 
the biggest users of the discount window (figure 4a) and they resorted heavily to the advance 
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 See Xenos (1869) for an informed – but not fully impartial – account of Overends’ unhappy Greek investments. 
5
 King (1936, p. 242). 
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facility – where, however, commercial banks held the lion’s share (figure 4b). The notable 
feature of the episode is that bill brokers and commercial banks were not usual customers of 
the Bank, which in “normal” times used to have only merchant banks and trading houses 
coming to its discount window (Flandreau and Ugolini, 2013).6 
 
Figures 3, 4a, and 4b about here 
 
What were applicants bringing to the Bank in exchange for cash? The composition of 
discounts, for which precise information is available, provides some elements of answer. The 
broad answer is: The same material as usual. If we sort out the paper discounted by the Bank 
in May 1866 according to acceptors (i.e. the firms which, after having been drawn upon, had 
underwritten the bills and thus bore the “initial” responsibility) and then compare it to the 
situation one year earlier, we get a very stable composition of the underlying material. To the 
extent that acceptors had to be rated for their paper to be recognized by the Bank of England, 
this implies that the underlying quality of the material they accepted was very stable. Tables 
1a-b illustrate this. They give the Bank’s twenty-five biggest exposures to acceptors 
(amounting to 39.5% of the total) in May 1866 as well as one year before the crisis. The 
shares and ranking of acceptors did not change considerably. Paper that was discounted by the 
Bank in normal times could be expected to be discounted during crises.  
 
Tables 1a-b about here 
 
To summarize, it appears that when the panic erupted, the Bank merely continued to do its 
“usual” business – although on a much grander scale. It kept lending, only it did much more 
and met demand for liquidity from all sides (despite the 1858 ban of bill brokers from the 
discount window). Next, underlying this “continuity” of operation, the nature (and thus 
quality) of the instruments considered eligible for refinancing operations did not change 
during the crisis. Guarantors (acceptors) deemed reliable before the crisis remained so during 
the crisis. In fact, as we also found, even in those cases in which the guarantee turned out to 
be dubious later (when the acceptor failed as a result of the crisis, as in the case of the Agra & 
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 It is interesting to note that following its going public and diversification of its business into a financial 
conglomerate in the 1860s, Overend, Gurney & Co. had no longer been considered by the Bank as a “bill 
broker” – its account being transferred to the commercial banks’ ledger since 1865 (Bank of England Archive, 
C24/1). This means that, already by this time, Overend was formally outside the scope of the 1858 rule, implying 
that the reason for refusing support had nothing to do with the rule itself. 
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Masterman Bank or the Consolidated Bank), the Bank of England adhered to the principle 
whereby it sustained its earlier policy. This supports the notion that a key aspect of crisis 
lending was indeed the question of the instrument upon which it lent, perhaps more than the 
identity of those to whom it lent. Indeed, it turns out that, among the discounters who received 
the biggest volumes of Bank’s liquidity, were some of the main casualties of the crisis (such 
as Agra & Masterman or the Bank of London). At first sight, this is consistent with Capie’s 
idea that the important question for lending of last resort is “What do you accept?” – not 
“From whom?”. However, as the next section shows, the “what” and “from whom” issues are 
more intertwined than a superficial reading of the crisis of 1866 would suggest. 
 
 
3. The Raised Eyebrow: From Lending of Last Resort to Banking Supervision 
 
Although generally originated in the course of commercial transactions (such as for the 
finance of physical commodity shipping), bills of exchange were not backed by a physical 
security. In case of default of the acceptor, the holder of the bill had the right to turn to 
previous endorsers, but in no case could they seize (say) the bales of cotton collateral that 
might have been mentioned on the bill.7 Hence, the “value” of a bill of exchange consisted of 
the names written on it and of those names alone. Exposure was exposure to names, and this 
meant that – willy-nilly – the Bank actually had to know and to care about who was on the 
other side of the discount window: “what” and “whom” were the two sides of the same coin. 
This helps explain the sophisticate system the Bank of England developed in order to 
monitor discounting risks. First, not anybody could be a discounter. This was a privilege and 
admittance in the discounters’ list required being presented by other members of the club and 
provide material guarantees.8 Second, risk management took the shape of a system of ledgers 
that permitted a real time control of exposure: Each bill that the Bank took in portfolio gave 
rise to two entries – one for the acceptor who had underwritten the bill, and one for the 
discounter who had presented it.9 By examining its ledgers, the Bank could see at a glance its 
exposure to any given signature. The quality of acceptors was periodically reviewed and 
                                                          
7
 Seyd (1868, pp. 81-3). 
8
 “Membership” shrank dramatically throughout the 19th century (Bignon, Flandreau, and Ugolini 2012). 
However, it seems that this owed to the consolidation of the banking system, not to the Bank striking out 
previous customers. 
9
 It also recorded information on drawers. See Flandreau and Ugolini (2013) for details.  
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recorded in so-called “rating books”. The evidence from the rating books also suggests that 
there were thresholds for exposure to any single risk (Bignon, Flandreau, and Ugolini 2012). 
The arrangement, which if we are to believe ledgers expanded after 1844, allowed the 
Bank to implement a close monitoring of the financial system. This monitoring was hardly 
anonymous. It enabled the Bank to keep a close eye on both the origination and the 
distribution of bills of exchange across the system (Flandreau and Ugolini, 2013). Critically, 
this allowed the Bank to observe when potentially speculative positions were in the course of 
being built by abnormal drawing or accepting of bills. Suppose for instance that some 
acceptor relaxed its standards and began accepting more paper than its capital permitted. The 
signature, thus indiscriminately thrown upon the market would have flowed back to the Bank 
of England, who would have immediately noticed the problem. For instance, in 1890 the 
Bank realized that Barings were getting into trouble long before the crisis, because the 
amount of Baring-accepted bills flowing into its portfolio through third-party discounts had 
become unusually large. The result were exchanges whereby the Bank of England pressured 
Barings to fall into line.10 The strategy may not have worked, but such monitoring made sure 
that the Bank would not be caught sleeping at the wheel (more on this in the conclusion). 
This sheds light on the Bank’s attitude towards the financial system and in particular, 
towards Overend, Gurney & Co. during the crisis of 1866. By controlling its exposure it 
limited the amount of credit that could be granted to any single individual: It was not enough 
to present paper on an acceptable signature, one had also to make sure that not too much of 
this paper would be presented to the Bank. Thus, if for any reason one financial agent had 
excess exposure to another, it would find itself on the hook for the excess. If such rules were 
understood by all participants, then no single failure could be a serious threat for the system at 
large. On the other hand, all those who had behaved “well” (by the Bank of England’s 
standards, which meant – among other things – being properly diversified) were eligible for 
assistance – assistance of the “ordinary” variety, through the discount window11. Under the 
new “regime” that was definitively established with the Crisis of 1866, the Bank was happy to 
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 While in October 1889 the Bank had had in its portfolio no more than £80,000 in bills accepted by Baring 
Bros, in early October 1890 its exposure had climbed to £500,000. At this date, George J. Goschen, then 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, noted down in his diary: “Went to the Bank, things queer! Some of the first houses 
talked about” (Clapham 1944, pp. 327-8). At the peak of the crisis (18th November 1890), the Bank’s exposure to 
Barings would reach £715,000 (Bank of England Archive, C22/43). The “anomalous” supply of acceptances by 
Barings is also manifest from the figures reported in Chapman (1984, p. 121).  
11
 It is crucial to note that the Bank never refused “ordinary” assistance to Overend, Gurney & Co.: because they 
were probably short of eligible securities, Overends never showed up at the discount window in the period 
preceding the crash, and only went to Threadneedle Street – when things were already beyond repair – to ask for 
“extraordinary” assistance (Bank of England Archive, C24/1). 
11 
discount proportionate amounts of bills guaranteed by all those signatures which were 
considered eligible in ordinary times (including those whose solvability was at risk of getting 
into trouble afterwards). Given the detailed knowledge that the Bank had of the money market 
and the redundant guarantees that it took from acceptors and discounters, given also the 
extreme division of risks in a system where the biggest exposure remained limited (as seen, 
the top acceptor was only 6% of the Bank’s portfolio) the policy was a very narrowly 
calculated risk. And this does not even include the strong interest discounters had in doing 
whatever they could in order not to lose access to the discount window. 
Thus, the sophisticate supervisory system put in place by the Bank of England around the 
mid-19th century allowed it to extend lending-of-last-resort operations without provoking an 
increase in moral hazard. As a matter of fact, throughout the 19th century the amounts-at-risk 
for the Bank experienced a secular decline, and by the late 1860s they had become basically 
negligible (Bignon, Flandreau, and Ugolini 2012). This, we argue, was Britain’s 19th-century 
recipe for financial stability. It consisted neither in reliance on abstract market discipline, nor 
on automatic and anonymous lending of last resort. It had little to do with the Gold Standard, 
and nothing at all with rescue operations. Rather, it rested on a strict monitoring system or, if 
one prefers, on a de facto central bank regulation. To this de facto regulation banks and 
money market participants had to submit, if they wanted to be in good terms with the central 
bank. Such good terms were valuable when crisis hit and the Bank was the last lender around 
– literally, the lender of last resort. 
This qualifies the oral tradition that in the late 19th century, supervision was minimal and 
dealt with the “Bank of England Governor’s eyebrow”.12 According to this view, it was 
enough for the Governor of the Bank to raise an eyebrow for bankers to put their house in 
order. There was, of course, much more to the raised eyebrow than the inconvenience of a 
stern look. There was detailed information by the Bank, and there was the Bank’s power to 
act by denying discounting facilities. For those needing a reminder, the corpse of Overends 
could be shown.13 
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 For a printed variant, Withers (1910, p. 56) has an intriguing digression on the Bank of England being the  
“final arbiter” when the credit of a house came under suspicion. 
13
 Another interesting case discussed in Flandreau and Ugolini (2013) is that of the House of Vagliano, who after 
a dispute with the Bank of England was excluded from the discount window and had to leave banking 
(Chatziioannou and Harlaftis 2007, pp. 38-9) 
12 
4. Twin Success: International Aspects of the Crisis of 1866 
 
But the panic of 1866 did not have solely domestic significance. As already indicated, the 
London market was relied upon by non-residents. London was a place where international 
supply and demand for short-term credit were cleared14. Foreign balances were held and 
funding was sought, notably – as indicated – trade finance. Figure 5 illustrates this, showing 
the breakdown of the Bank of England’s portfolio of bills according to the geography of 
drawers: It shows totals drawn by domestic (“inland”) vs. foreign drawers (i.e. foreign and 
colonial). We see the predominance of foreign originations. In May 1866, 65% of the bills 
discounted by the Bank in May had been drawn by agents residing outside the country. As a 
result, both the crisis and the Bank of England’s actions to handle it were bound to have a 
significant impact on sterling as an international currency. 
The crisis translated into increased risk aversion on behalf of international investors, and 
contemporaries pointed to what is today known as a “sudden stop” (Calvo 1998). The 
mechanism they had in mind is today known as that of twin crises: In the instance, a credit 
crisis that was becoming a currency crisis. The sterling confidence crisis that developed was 
triggered by the surge in credit risk associated with the failure of Overends (Patterson 1870, 
pp. 227-8 is perhaps the most articulate illustration).15 Unsure about the prospects of the 
London market, foreign investors liquidated positions and repatriated balances. The 
consequence was, in the immediate aftermath of the crisis, a weakening of sterling in spite of 
the exceptionally high interest rates the Bank maintained. In fact, if we use market rate 
differentials to compute the “forward” sterling-franc exchange rate and compare it to the gold 
points (Figure 6), we see that the credibility of sterling which was already under (mild) 
suspicion before the crisis came under serious doubt during the panic (a “forward” rate below 
the gold export point suggests that sterling suffered a credibility crisis and indeed, in April, 
the forward exchange rate raced away from the gold points). As for the spot rate it stayed 
discouragingly close to the gold export point following the Overend collapse, despite a 
baffling 6% interest rate differential between London and Paris.16 
Thus the 1866 crisis was also a currency crisis. It was arguably the worst experienced by 
sterling during the whole “classical” gold standard period (1821-1913), at least if we are to 
                                                          
14
 For an account of the international foreign exchange market in the mid-19th century, see Ugolini (2012). 
15
 See also Juglar (1889, p. 368); Wirth (1890, pp. 434-5); Macleod (1891, pp. 833-4). 
16
 Hawtrey (1919, pp. 149-50) argues that foreign investors were questioning the viability of the gold standard. 
This may be exaggerated: After losing £1.3m in the first two weeks after 11th May, the gold reserve surpassed its 
pre-crisis level in June, and never sank below it in spite of the fact that an additional drain took place in July 
(figure 6). Thus, the case for a confidence crisis is strong (Ugolini 2010). 
13 
evaluate this from the length and extent of the “high rates” period: Faced with reserve losses, 
the Bank of England had to keep the interest rate at a record level (10%) for more than three 
months, the longest period ever (Clapham 1944, pp. 429-32). Many observers saw the crisis 
as a blow to the reputation of London as an international money market. The shock was 
deterring foreign creditors from investing in English money market instruments despite the 
high rates. This opinion was taken seriously by the British Foreign Office, which felt it was 
necessary to send a circular to all diplomatic representations reassuring foreigners about the 
solidity of the English financial system17. Indeed, the policy followed by the Bank of England 
resulted from the same reading of the crisis – i.e., that the currency crisis would be resolved if 
the credit crisis was resolved. Such was also the logic of Bagehot’s exhortations for generous 
lending against good collateral, while the “high rates” he also advised would take care of the 
currency crisis. 
The consequences of this policy were equally important. At the end of the day, those 
investors who had not panicked and kept their money in London fared very well compared, 
say, to a counterfactual investment in Paris. Consider for instance an investor who would have 
converted his sterling into French francs bills with short maturities one month before the crisis 
(mid-March 1866) and then reinvested the bills as they matured, say week after week, during 
6 months (until mid-September 1866) and then converted the proceeds in sterling again, and 
compare this investment with a similar one this time in sterling all the way through. At the 
end of the period the difference in yield between franc and sterling was 2.14% in favour of 
sterling, or an annualized differential of 4.28%.18 This is one measure of the extent to which 
the more versatile – those who had fled to seek safety abroad -- were encouraged to be faithful 
in the future. We conclude that the Bank of England’s adoption of lending-of-last-resort 
policies in 1866 was one aspect of the process through which the role of sterling as a key 
reserve asset was established.19 In successfully dealing with the financial shock, the Bank of 
England acquired enormous financial clout, and this cannot have been an irrelevant aspect of 
its subsequent triumphs. 
 
Figure 5 about here 
                                                          
17
 The text of the circular is found in Patterson (1870, pp. 234-5). 
18
 Authors computations from data in Ugolini (2010). Details available from authors. 
19
 The fact that a central bank should be expected to behave in such a way could not have been taken for granted 
at the time: for instance, the Bank of France’s inability to do so after the events of 1870 seriously compromised 
the fate of the franc as an international currency. Bagehot himself noted this with satisfaction, but not without 
preoccupation: High-minded concern about the increased responsibility falling upon the Bank of England after 
the French debacle may have been a key motivation for Lombard Street (Bagehot 1873, pp. 31-2). 
14 
Figure 6 about here 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
Relying on new statistical evidence (Flandreau and Ugolini 2013) this chapter has 
surveyed crucial elements of the management of the crisis of 1866. First, our assessment 
sheds new light on how Britain found her path towards financial stability in the second half of 
the 19th century. By investigating the structure of the money market and the central bank’s 
actions during the crisis, we have shown that Britain’s recipe for financial stability consisted 
of a combination of generous liquidity provision and strict monitoring, made possible by the 
credible threat of exclusion from the central bank’s standing facilities. The Bank’s decisive 
adoption of this approach in 1866 reflected the end of credit rationing that had characterized 
crisis management until in 1857  (Bignon, Flandreau, and Ugolini 2012) and paved the way 
for the establishment of a more resilient financial system in the following decades. 
Second, we have emphasized the significance of the new policy beyond Britain and the 
British financial system. The successful handling of the situation by the Bank of England, we 
argued, had implications at the international level. The Bank had dealt with a twin crisis: The 
seizure experienced by the London money market in the few hours that followed the collapse 
of Overend, Gurney & Co. tested the resilience of British trade credit institutions and the 
stability of sterling. Therefore, the Bank’s eventual success contributed to establishing the 
role of sterling as an international currency.  
Last, in a volume devoted to British financial crises, it seems natural to end this chapter on 
the crisis of 1866 with a comparison. We suggest one with the Baring crisis of 1890. One 
major difference between the two crises is that, while the Bank let Overends fail, it did 
organize a rescue of Barings – although it made sure that the bankers paid dearly for it, so that 
the frequently used wording “bail out” is inappropriate. We can think of one main difference 
between the two crises that may account for the contrasted behaviour. The fall of a bill broker 
was bound to inflict losses to commercial banks but, since bill brokers did not play a first-
stage role in the origination of money market instruments (see figure 1), there was nothing in 
Overends’ fall that would impair the operation of the money market: If cash was needed, the 
Bank could always provide it, and no large amount of information would be destroyed. By 
contrast, the fall of a first-order merchant bank such as Barings shattered the foundations of 
the London money market. Barings, unlike Overends, were large acceptors whose paper was 
15 
“normally” received by the Bank of England: Refusing Barings’ paper would undermine the 
London money market and send shockwaves throughout the system.20 There was this, and 
there was also the large exposure that the Bank of England had to Barings – in contrast with 
the lack of exposure it had to Overends.  
                                                          
20
 The systemic importance of merchant banks will again be proved by another crucial event in British financial 
history – i.e., the crisis of 1931 (Accominotti 2012). 
16 
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Figure 1: Stylized structure of the English financial system in the 19th century. 
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Figure 3: Daily discounts and advances by the Bank of England in May 1866. Source: 
Flandreau and Ugolini (2013). 
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Figure 5: Geographical origin of the bills discounted by the Bank in May 1866 (per kind of 
discounter). Source: Flandreau and Ugolini (2013). 
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Figure 6: International aspects of the 1866 crisis: variation of the Bank of England’s gold 
reserve, and spot and “forward” franc-pound exchange rates. Sources: Ugolini (2010); The 
Economist (1865-6); Seyd (1868). 
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May 1865 
1 London Joint Stock Bank  166'862.66  7.75% 
2 Union Bank of London  84'419.34  3.92% 
3 London & County Bank  69'317.37  3.22% 
4 City of Glasgow Bank  52'555.49  2.44% 
5 Imperial Ottoman Bank  42'580.81  1.98% 
6 Frühling & Goschen  42'560.03  1.98% 
7 The City Bank  39'170.67  1.82% 
8 Drake Kleinwort & Cohen  29'261.21  1.36% 
9 Bank of London  26'359.61  1.23% 
10 Agra & Masterman's Bank  24'504.00  1.14% 
11 Baring Brothers & Co  21'635.55  1.01% 
12 Finlay Campbell & Co  19'216.32  0.89% 
13 F Huth & Co  19'029.89  0.88% 
14 The National Bank  15'793.46  0.73% 
15 Finlay Hodgson & Co  14'456.01  0.67% 
16 NM Rothschild & Sons  12'853.00  0.60% 
17 Union Bank of Australia  12'498.68  0.58% 
18 Dadalhai Naoroji & Co  12'000.00  0.56% 
19 Glyn Mills Currie & Co  11'956.26  0.56% 
20 Mercht Bkg Co of London  11'264.87  0.52% 
21 Oriental Bank Corporation  11'139.60  0.52% 
22 Moses Brothers  10'200.00  0.47% 
23 Colonial Bank  10'179.34  0.47% 
24 Alliance Bank  9'101.34  0.42% 
25 JH Schroder & Co  8'421.57  0.39% 
 TOTAL 777'337.08 36.13% 
 
May 1866 
1 London Joint Stock Bank  637'028.01  6.21% 
2 Union Bank of London  474'520.92  4.62% 
3 The National Bank  321'824.83  3.14% 
4 Frühling & Goschen  279'321.03  2.72% 
5 Agra & Masterman's Bank  191'511.83  1.87% 
6 The City Bank  188'088.95  1.83% 
7 North Western Bank  175'129.64  1.71% 
8 London & County Bank  150'793.66  1.47% 
9 Baring Brothers & Co  147'425.16  1.44% 
10 Royal Bank of Liverpool  146'905.89  1.43% 
11 Drake Kleinwort & Cohen  144'033.20  1.40% 
12 F Huth & Co  125'467.88  1.22% 
13 Finlay Hodgson & Co  123'896.58  1.21% 
14 City of Glasgow Bank  96'051.60  0.94% 
15 JS Morgan & Co  95'764.03  0.93% 
16 Bank of Liverpool  85'577.62  0.83% 
17 Ebbw-Vale Company Limited  80'771.80  0.79% 
18 Smith Fleming & Co  80'741.91  0.79% 
19 Consolidated Bank  80'253.50  0.78% 
20 R & J Henderson  77'485.63  0.76% 
21 Oriental Bank Corporation  77'025.64  0.75% 
22 Finlay Campbell & Co  75'030.05  0.73% 
23 Mercht Bkg Co of London  72'484.53  0.71% 
24 Dickinson W & Co  62'141.31  0.61% 
25 Glyn Mills Currie & Co  61'882.74  0.60% 
 TOTAL 4'051'157.91 39.5% 
 
Table 1a-b: Top 25 acceptors of the bills discounted by the Bank in May 1865 and in May 
1866. Source: Flandreau and Ugolini (2013). Note: Institutions in the top 25 at both dates are 
shown in bold characters. That makes 16 out of 25. 
 
 
